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In a series of recent works Burton, Field, and Higley have sought to establish a
new elite paradigm and to develop out of it theories of substantial explanatory
power.1 They have so far provided critical evaluations of previous elite theory and
proposals for its systematization and development (Field and Higley 1980; Burton
and Higley 1987a; Field et al. 1988a), broad accounts ofrelationships between types
of national elites, elite transformations, and political stability or instability since 1500
(Field and Higley 1985; Higley and Burton 1988), and fuller accounts of two types
of elite transformation: elite settlements in England, Sweden, Colombia, and
Venezuela (Burton and Higley 1987b) and "two-step" transformations in France,
Italy, Japan, and West Germany since World War 11(Field et al. 1988b). While the
range claimed for the analytical power of the paradigm is very broad, it is of particular
relevance to Latin Americanists both because it is presented in principIe as a general
framework for the understanding of the origins of political stability or the lack of it,
and because two of the four cases of elite settlements, and the only two to have
occurred in the twentieth century, are taken from Latin America. Significant
statements of the character and implications of the paradigm have appeared in
previous working papers in this series, and this paper offers an assessment of the
paradigm as it currentiy stands, and a brief comment on its Latin American
dimensions.
Recognizing and seeking to remedy serious problems in classical elite theory as
developed by Michels, Mosca, and Pareto, they advance the cause of their new elitist
paradigm over pluralist and Marxist rivals, as capable of filling the gap resulting from
the current absence of a dominant paradigm in political sociology (Burton and Higley
1987a: 235-236). They intend to proceed, following a suggestion made by
Zuckerman (1977), by developing out of this paradigm theories of wide explanatory
power. Contentions regarding the inevitability of elites, the variability of elites, and
the interdependence of elite s and nonelites are explored and refined, and some broad
general claims are advanced. Within this framework, specific global-historical
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comparative explanations relating to political stability and the emergence of
democracy are advanced and systematically tested against available historical
evidence. The central claims made are that fundamental explanations for global
patterns of political stability or instability and for the emergence of preconditions for
democracy are themselves political rather than social, economic, cultural, or "social
structural"; and specifically that these explanations are related to national elite states
and transformations.
Three possible elite states are described: ideologically unified, consensually
unified, and disunified; a fourth state, partially or imperfectly unified, appears on
occasions (see Field and Higley 1980: 39-41, 1985: 7-8) and seems now to be
subsumed as the first step in the two-step transformation. Ideological unity is
ascribed to "totalitarian" regimes (Field and Higley 1985: 7-8; Burton and Higley
1987b: 297) but neither the concept nor specific cases are discussed or developed at
length; disunity is held to be the original state of virtually all national elites, and the
generic condition or modal pattern historically and today (Higley and Burton 1988: 3-
14). Transformation from elite disunity to consensual unity is held to be an essential
precondition for political stability and lasting democratic transitions (Field and Higley
1980: 117; Higley and Burton 1988: 9). Three historical routes for this
transformation are identified: (1) special colonial legacies where consensus is
achieved prior to national independence; (2) elite settlements, where elites negotiate a
sudden and deliberate compromise; and (3) two-step transformations, where first a
consensually oriented bloc gains stable majority electoral support, and subsequently a
radical minority abandons its distinctive ideological position and adheres to the
consensus achieved by its adversaries (Higley and Burton 1988: 24; Field et al.
1988b: 5---6).
These successive works represent a substantial and developing theoretical effort,
aimed at reestablishing the classical elite paradigm on a new and superior basis. 1
intend to offer here a critique of this new paradigm, recognizing as its progenitors do
that many of its elements are no more than provisionally sketched in, and
concentrating upon what appear to me to be fundamental weaknesses. 1 shall argue
that there are problems of ambiguity and potentially serious tautology in key
definitions and in the relationships between them; that the account given of conditions
for initial elite transformation is deficient; that issues of internal elite structure aod
relations and mechanisms for the maintenance of elite consensus and rule are
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unexplored; that on their own evidence, the elite settlements identified do not fulfill
the condition of elite consensus as defined; that where elite transformations occur they
are best seen as midpoints in broader processes of change rather than as fundamental
starting points; and, finally, that when the consequences of these several failings are
assessed, the central contentions of a fairly straightforward Marxist paradigm are
confirmed, and shown to have far greater explanatory power than this born-again
rival.
Definitions
According to the most recent statement of the central proposition of the new elite
paradigm, "A disunified national elite. . . produces a series of unstable regimes that
tend to oscillate between authoritarian or democratic forms over various intervals. A
consensually unified national elite. . . produces a stable regime that may evolve into a
modern democracy . . . if economic and other facilitative conditions perrnit" (Higley
and Burton 1988: 2). National elite s are defined as "persons who are able, by virtue
of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever
kind, to affect national outcomes regularly and substantial1y" (ibid.: 4). This expands
slightly upon an earlier definition of elites as "simply people who are ab1e, through
their positions in powerful organizations, to affect national polítical outcomes
individual1y, regularly, and seriously" (Burton and Hig1ey 1987b: 296; see also Field
and Higley 1980: 20). A national elite is defined as "consensually unified" when "its
members (1) share a largely tacit consensus about rules and codes of poli tic al conduct
amounting to a 'restrained partisanship' and (2) participa te in a more or less
comprehensively integrated structure of interaction which provides them with
relatively reliable and effective access to each other and to the most central decision-
makers" (Higley and Burton 1988: 4); it is defined as disunified when "its members
(1) share few or no understandings about the proprieties ofpolitical conduct, and (2)
engage in only limited and sporadic interactions across factional or sectoral
boundaries" (ibid.: 5).
It should be noted he re in passing that an early statement of the theory actually
denies that elite structure and behavior can be observed or measured fully, and
therefore proposes to treat the "construct" of elite unity as stemming from an
"observable" episode of origination of such a state (Field and Higley 1985: 2-3). No
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reasons are given for the assumption that the originating act is easier to verify
empirically than the state of elite unity itself: it is one thing to propose a "construct"
and use it as a basis for predictions regarding independent "observables," and quite
another to claim, as Field and Higley do, that the coming into existence of a particular
phenomenon is observable, even though that same phenomenon itself is not (ibid.:
10). In any case, doubts about the empirical verification of a state of elite unity do
not prevent the listing of numerous specific characteristics of such a state (ibid.: 7),
nor, as we have seen, the subsequent provision of a clear definition. Nor has the
same principIe be en applied to the issue of finding observable empirical referents for
stability and instability, so any scientific principIe that is he Id to be involved has not
be en applied consistently. It seems that what was then being asserted, and what
remains central to the paradigm, is that historical episodes of elite transformation to
unity can be identified (by evidence of sudden or phased movement toward
commitment to agreed procedural norms, and effective access, in recent definitions),
and that once achieved, elite unity, and hence political stability, is never lost. The
original act, in other words, is sufficient evidence for the continuing state. This very
bold claim is discussed further below.
Proceeding further with the basic definitions advanced, a poli tic al regime is said
to be unstable "whenever government executive power is subject to irregular seizures,
attempted seizures, or widely expected seizures by force" (Higley and Burton 1988:
8). However, it is added immediately that in some cases (Uruguay from 1904 to
1973, Chile from 1932 to 1970-71, France from 1875 to 1940) that this definition
would not cover, there may nevertheless be "an underlying condition of elite
disunity"; therefore, the authors propose, "for a lasting democratic transition to occur,
the national elite must first be transformed from disunity to consensual unity" (ibid.:
9).
This rider is significant, and its consequences require detailed exploration. The
shift from "political stability" to "lasting democratic transition" obscures the fact that
an alternative approach is being proposed here to the identification of political
instability, to cover awkward cases: a regime is now to be considered politically
unstable unless an identifiable elite transformation to consensual unity has taken
place; in the absence of evidence of such a transformation, "the analyst should
presume that the elite remains disunified, and the regime remains unstable" (ibid.:
10).
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This move renders the initial statement that a disunified elite produces a series of
unstable regimes tautological and unfalsifiable. At the same time, it clearly violates
Burton and Higley's statement elsewhere, advanced specifically to overcome the
problem of circularity of argument, that "criteria for classifying elites and outcomes
must be independent and tied to distinct observables" (Burton and Higley 1987a:
230). For this requirement to be met in a way that supports the theory, a definition of
political instability must be provided, with its own independent referents, which
plausibly fits cases where no elite transformation to consensual unity has been
identified, while excluding those where such a transformation is claimed to have
taken place.
At first sight, this evident difficu1ty with regard to unstable regimes might not
appear to weaken the theory as a whole, as this concentrates in the main on the
consequences of changes in elite states from disunity to consensual unity. As an
early paper argues, "The basic hypothesis is . . . that changes in the states of national
elite s . . . precede and bring about changes in political stability and instability" (Field
and Higley 1985: 2). As the changes of interest are those to stability and potentially
to democracy, and as our authors find no clear historical cases of movement from
consensual unity to disunity, it seems appropriate to read them as only advancing the
single claim that where an elite transformation to consensual unity has taken place,
political stability and a strong tendency for democracy will ensue.
Even here, though, the concession made with regard to the independent
identification of political instability causes '1 problem. If long periods of apparent
stability can mask an underlying instability in regimes where no prior elite
transformation has occurred, then the mere fact of apparent stability in regimes where
such an elite transformation is alleged to have taken place cannot be taken as
independent evidence in support of the theory. In other words, until the question of
independent criteria for the identification of political instability short of regime
overthrow is clarified, we have no independent criteria for the identification of
political stability of the kind that is created by consensual elite unity. This in turn
suggests two separate lines of inquiry. The first concerns the issue of falsifiability.
The second relates to the relationship proposed between elite transformation to
consensual unity and political stability; a close examination of this relationship now
will provide a basis for a later assessment of its plausibility and possible explanatory
power. In view of the methodological stand the authors take, the issue of
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falsifiability is an important one. It is also clear that the authors of the new paradigm
are willing to be judged by the plausibility of the relationships they propose, and the
use they make of the empirical evidence available to them, to support the central
falsifiable proposition they advance.
If we turn our attention to the question of what would constitute unequivocal
evidence of a breakdown of political stability, we find a clearly falsifiable and
nontautological claim of quite sufficient significance to make the theory advanced well
worthy of close consideration. In their definition of political instability, Higley and
Burton disallow both "a high incidence of poli tic al violence in the form of revolts,
riots, strikes, mass demonstrations, and individual actions" and "frequent changes in
the makeup of goveming coalitions and cabinets" as indicators of instability. These
criteria are rejected "because nearly all regimes at various times would qualify on one
or both counts" (a significant point to which I shall retum). They therefore settle on
the definition given above - "subject to irregular seizures, attempted seizures, or
widely expected seizures by force" (Higley and Burton 1988: 8). It therefore seems
correct to construe them here as proposing that a regime should be judged stable
when it is not subject to such expected, attempted, or actual seizure.
Taking into account the difficulty noted above, we would regard the theory as
definitely falsified, in part or in whole, if events that qualified as transformations to
consensual elites were followed anywhere by regime seizure by force, and seriously
weakened by good evidence of expected or attempted seizures by force following
such events. However, the theory would not be substantiated by continuing stability
as it appears to be defined. In other words, we should take as the central contention
the specific claim that where an identifiable elite transform-ation to consensual unity
has taken place, and in the absence of defeats in intemational warfare (Field and
Higley 1985: 11), regime breakdown through seizure by force will never occur.2 We
have already seen that this is implied in the treatment of elite unity. We should further
note, lest this should still seem too bold a claim to hold our authors to, that in view of
their difficulty over the independent identification of a state of instability (and the
corresponding difficulty regarding stability), if they are not saying this, they are not
saying anything.
The theory as it stands would be refuted, then, if regime breakdown occurred in
England, Sweden, Colombia, or Venezuela, all of which have been identified as
cases of elite settlement; or in Mexico, Spain, Austria, or Costa Rica, if evidence is
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found of qualifying elite settlements there, as has been tentatively suggested (Burton
and Higley, 1987b: 298); or in France, Italy, Japan, or West Germany, where two-
step transformations have been identified, or in Belgium, Denmark, or Norway,
where it is suggested that they have taken place. In addition, it would be refuted if
clear cases of elite settlement could be found, fitting the definition advanced as well as
any of the cases thus far identified, in countries that have since suffered seizure of
power by force. As yet, as the authors acknowledge, little attention has been paid to
negative cases, although a case has recently been made in brief for the absence of an
elite settlement in France in 1875 (Higley and Burton 1988: 20-22). It would
presumably also be greatly weakened if evidence could be found of successive elite
settlements in any single country, as this would suggest that such settlements are not
the once-and-for-all events they are claimed to be.
Given the manner in which the theory is set up, and the problems discussed
above, the issue of falsifiability is an important one. An issue of equal importance
concems the plausibility of the key relationships proposed, and the quality of the
evidence brought forward to support them. With this in mind, let us now tum to a
fuller examination of the relationship proposed between elite consensus and political
stability. We have already noted some difficulty over the identification of stability,
and discovered in passing that it is not held to be incompatible with "a high incidence
of political violence in the form of revolts, riots, strikes, mass demonstrations, and
individual actions." We may proceed further by bringing the definitions of "elite" and
"consensual elite" together. This provides us with a description of a consensual elite
as one in which persons, who are able by virtue of their authoritative positions in
powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind to affect national outcomes
regularly and substantially, share a largely tacit consensus amounting to a "restrained
partisanship" and enjoy relatively reliable and effective access to each other and to the
most effective decision makers.
There is an apparently minor issue of ambiguity here, which must be noted, in the
failure to specify the inclusion of al! such persons. Were it in doubt that such is the
intention, the issue would be a major one, as the door would be opened to future
instability arising from the actions of excluded elites. But the reference to elites as "a
nation's top leadership in all sectors" and the reference back at the same point 10 an
earlier definition (from Field and Higley 1973: 8) of national elites as encompassing
"all those persons capable, if they wish, of making substantial poli tic al trouble for
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high officials . . . without being promptIy repressed" seem to put the issue beyond
doubt (Burton and Higley 1987b: 296).
Now, where all persons capable of causing serious trouble enjoy access and are
cornmitted to restrained partisanship, it may seem to follow automatically that political
stability will result, as there is little scope or motive for the forcible overthrow of the
regime; indeed, Higley and Burton comment that "it follows that, once this type of
national elite is created, and so long as it persists, forcible seizures of government
power by one or another discontented faction will not occur" (Higley and Burton
1988: 5). But when this claim is further examined, and set in the context of the
argument as a whole, it is clear that very substantial claims are being made. First of
all, we must take the claim to be not simply that all elites are concerned, but also that
only elites, defined as "a nation's top leadership in all sectors," are able to affect
national political outcomes regularly and substantially, at least to the extent of forcibly
overthrowing the regime. Otherwise, consensual elite unity would not rule out
regime overthrow. The ability of elites to affect national outcomes is, in other words,
fundamentally different in character to that of nonelites. In a separate discussion,
Burton and Higley make clear their commitment to a theory that allows elites and
nonelites "an important measure of independence in determining specific political
outcomes," and endorse the view that "to govern and to perpetuate their statuses,
elites must appeal to and mobilize nonelite support" (Burton and Higley 1987a: 232-
233). This is consistent with an earlier discussion (Field and Higley 1980: 19-20)
that confines the roles of nonelites to setting broad limits to elite action, rather than
independentIy bringing about particular outcomes. As yet the issue of elite-nonelite
interdependence has not been introduced directly into the recent detailed discussions
of elite transformation and its consequences, and we must assume that whatever its
implications, elite consensus is sufficient to remove the possibility that nonelite action
might bring down a regime, or even, presumably, cause it "serious trouble."
Second, it is claimed that such consensually unified elites have in fact come into being
in identifiable historical episodes, either as consequences of particular forms of
colonial rule, or as a result of the sudden and deliberate reorganization of elite
relations through "elite settlements," or through a more graduated two-step
transformation. Third, and most significant, it is claimed that once such an elite
consensus has been reached, it will outlive the particular individual s who made it, and
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project political stability indefinitely into the future. In the following section 1 shall
explore these claims further.
To conclude this section, which is concerned only with the basic definitions upon
which the paradigm rests, 1 examine in detail the relationship between the definitions
of consensual elite s and political stability, of which the most interesting feature is not
any apparent circularity, but almost the reverse - the striking disproportionality
between the two.
The disproportionality in question is between political stability as an absence of
expected, attempted, or actual regime overthrow, and elite consensus as embracing all
persons capable of regularly and substantially affecting national political outcomes.
Burton and Higley variously define elites as including "top position-holders in the
largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military,
professional, cornmunications and cultural organizations and movements in a society"
(Higley and Burton 1988: 4), and as "a nation's top leadership in all sectors -
political, governmental, business, trade union, military, media, religious, and
intellectual- including both 'establishment' and 'counterelite' factions" (Burton and
Higley 1987b: 296). Considered in isolation, this is an acceptab1e, indeed a
conventional definition; but it sits uneasily alongside the related treatment of political
stability as definitively terminated only by regime seizure by force, and thus calls into
question the plausibility of the proposed relationship. The ability to affect national
political outcomes regularly and seriously is one thing, and the ability to mount a
credible threat to overthrow a regime is quite another. For political stability to be
assured, why require the consensus of all elites in a position to affect national
outcomes seriously? Why is the consensus of only those elite s in a position to mount
such a credible threat not sufficient? Conversely, if one occurrence of forcible
overthrow is sufficient to demonstrate the absence of consensus, why should the elite
groups in question need the ability to affect national outcomes regularly, as well as
seriously? It seems that the stipulation of an ability to affect national outcomes
seriously is too permissive, while the stipulation of an ability to do so regularly is too
restrictive, once the issue of regime seizure by force is brought into the picture. If we
turn our attention to specific elite sectors, it may be admitted at once that the military
is not the only group able to overthrow a regime, if it is al so accepted that the
ascription of such an ability to other elite groups (for example, the clergy in Iran)
raises unanswered questions about elite-nonelite relations. But it seems unduly
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permissive to propose a definition that allows all the elite groups identified an equal
ability in this regard, and fails to enquire into possible relationships between them.
There is a substantial distance, in other words, in terms of probable actors and of
degree, between regular and serious effects upon national outcomes, and regime
overthrow. Ambiguity thus arises from the unwillingness of the authors to
differentiate among the various sectors of the elite. Considerable further ambiguity
arises from the fact that riots, revolts, strikes, and mass demonstrations are all
pronounced compatible with political stability arising out of elite consensus.
An obvious query concerns the scale of such action that is possible without some
substantial expectation of regime overthrow arising; a more significant query prompts
itself with regard to the scale compatible with any credible assertion that elite
consensus still exists. It may seem reasonable, for particular purposes, to define
poli tic al stability in such a way that permits riots and revolts; it does not seem
reasonable to link such a definition without further discussion to countries dominated
by consensual elites of the kind described.
The root cause of the difficulty here seems to lie in the polarization of elite types
as "consensually unified" or "disunified," respectively. Between the sharing of a
largely tacit consensus amounting to restrained partisanship on the one hand and the
sharing of few or no understandings about the proprieties of political conduct on the
other there lies a vast space, as there does between a more or less comprehensively
integrated structure of interaction, and limited and sporadic interactions across
factional or sectoral boundaries, respectively. Such a degree of polarization might
seem appropriate for the construction of ideal types, but it provides a very blunt
instrument for the classification of existing elites, and their linking to the likelihood of
regime overthrow. Furthermore, by committing themselves to classify all actually
existing historical elites (leaving aside the separate cases of ideological unity) as one
or the other, and abandoning the category of partial unity en route in the process,
Burton, Field, and Higley themselves create the need to pinpoint dramatic
transformations from one to the other. On practically any rough empirical
assessment, a substantial number of elites would be located between these two poles,
thus converting it into a continuum; what is more, many elites would move back and
forth over time, without necessarily either achieving the state of bliss of consensual
unity, or experiencing breakdown.
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It is of course vital, for the proponents of the new elitist paradigm, to insist on
polar opposites in the real world, as against a continuum, or their argument for the
origins of political stability, and the whole paradigm as presentIy constructed,
immediately collapses. But it appears to rest upon an undefended transmutation of
ideal types into real world typological categories, and to overlook the space between
the two types in question. Their inability to distinguish clearly between political
stability and instability, in spite of the extreme gulf they perceive between disunified
and consensually unified elites, gives us reason to be suspicious of this procedure.
So does the disparity between their definitions of elite consensus and poli tic al
stability, respectively. So, indeed, does their reluctance to inquire in any systematic
manner into possible direct empirical referents of elite unity. It appears, then, that
many of the fundamental and distinctive claims of the paradigm are of questionable
validity. As we have seen, though, its progenitors attach particular importance to
their ability to identify original episodes of elite transformation to consensual unity.
To a large extent it is upon this that the theory rests. In the circumstances, we should
examine very closely the claims made for such episodes, and it is to the most
elaborated of those, elite settlement, to which 1 now turno
Elite Settlements
Elite settlements are defined as "relatively rare events in which warring national elite
factions suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating
compromises on their most basic disagreements." They are initially claimed to have
two main consequences: the creation of peaceful competition in accordance with the
norms of restrained partisanship, and the generation of regimes in which "forcible
power seizures no longer occur and are not widely expected" (Burton and Higley
1987b: 295). In a subsequent account the second of these consequences is said to
follow from the first, and the procedural consequence of restrained partisanship is
supplemented by a substantive consequence also touched upon elsewhere in the
earlier article: assured access to decision making which over time allows elites to
achieve their most basic aims (Higley and Burton 1988: 5). 1 take it, therefore, that
elite settlements have both procedural and substantive consequences for participating
elites, and that political stability follows. 1 shall argue here that the account provided
of the origins of elite settlements is inadequate, that the settlements described do not
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fulfill the conditions required for the creation of consensual elites, and that an account
of mechanisms for the maintenance and periodic renegotiation of elite consensus is
required, but not given.
In their full discussion of elite settlements, Burton and Higley are not only
con cerned to establish such settlements as distinct forms of majar political change;
they also seek to advance "a particular theoretical view" of them, contending "that (1)
elite settlements are the result of relatively autonomous elite choices and thus cannot
be predicted or explained in terms of social, economic or cultural forces; (2) the
consensually unified elite structure created by a settlement constitutes the primary
basis for subsequent political stability; which (3) is a necessary condition for the
emergence and sustained practice of representative democratic politics" (Burton and
Higley 1987b: 304). These are large claims, and I shall examine the fIrst two in some
detail. First of all, we may deal with the issue of prediction. Clearly, the analysis
provided by Burton and Higley is no more able to predict elite settlements than any
that might be based upon social, economic, or cultural forces. The settlements they
discuss come at the end of periods of costly and inconclusive conflict, which begin to
threaten elite supremacy, and are precipitated by particular crises; but it is nowhere
argued that this combination of circumstances serves to predict elite settlement. Nor
could it be, as these precipitating circumstances are as common historically as elite
settlements are rare, and even in the cases where the latter occur, there is no saying
why they come at a particular point in the course of conflict, or as a consequence of a
particular crisis. Indeed, the very stress upon such settlements as the outcome of
sudden and autonomous elite choices seems to rule out prediction, or if it is claimed,
to reintroduce an unfortunate element of determinism.
Similar considerations apply to the explanation provided for elite settlements.
This is conducted purely in terms of the motives elites have and the autonomy they
enjoy from pressure from nonelites. As a consequence of costly and inconclusive
conflict "elites are disposed to compromise if at all possible" (Burton and Higley
1987b: 298). But as we have already learned that frequent, costly, and presumably
inconclusive conflict is the generic condition of disunified elites, we are bound to ask
why all elites are not so disposed, and why elite settlements are not the norm, rather
than the exception. This in turn directs our attention to a further question, essential to
any coherent explanation, and directly begged by the phrase "disposed to compromise
if at al! possible" (emphasis mine). When is it possible for elites who may wish lO
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compromise to do so? One answer is given: when they are not unduly constrained by
pressure from nonelites. But, first, such a situation is held to be characteristic of
countries at a relatively low level of socioeconomic development, on which grounds
no historical cases can be ruled out; and, second, it is specifically stated that the four
countries examined were experiencing "levelling tendencies," suggesting that in these
cases pressure from below was growing rather than declining. Pressure from below
and its relative absence both seem to serve as explanations.
The most curious feature of the explanation, however, is that no account at all is
taken of the nature of the substantive interests of elites, although, as we have seen, it
is assumed that after the settlement, those interests are assured. It is argued at one
point that "all four national elites enjoyed considerable autonomy from mass
followings and pressures. Elite factions and their leaders could compromise on
questions of principIe without strong pressures to stand firm" (ibid.: 301). This
implies that followers have principIes, but elites do not; and it must further imply
either that elites have no substantive interests, or that such interests do not en ter into
or impede settlements: if only followers will relinquish their commitments to specific
outcomes, elites are free to negotiate binding settlements among themselves. This is
entirely implausible, yet, to repeat the point, at no point in any of the discussion of
elite settlements are the various substantive interests of participating elites considered.
To summarize, no adequate explanation is provided for the ability to achieve elite
settlements. The general "explanation" given does not differentiate the four
paradigmatic cases from others in which disunified elite s existed, and simply assumes
the absence, or automatic resolution, of fundamental conflicts over substantive
issues. Indeed, Burton and Higley acknowledge that their approach has not allowed
them "to sort out and look far causal connections between the various social,
economic, cultural and poli tic al farces that may affect elite settlements" (ibid.: 304).
They cannot at the same time claim to have advanced an explanation far elite
settlements. At most they can claim to have identified such settlements, and provided
a partial description of them. The same admission, incidentally, points to a further
ambiguity, with regard to the role they are actually claiming for political explanation.
At times it appears to be a sufficient altemative to other types of explanation; at times
it appears as the principal element in a broader explanation; and at times (as here) it
appears a necessary element in a broader explanation, but of indeterminate weight.
Equally, the absence of any development of the theory in this direction throws serious
14
doubt on the claim that such settlements should be viewed as primary, fundamental or
causally prior events, giving rise to consensual unity and political stability. As yet,
there is no reason to reject the view that such settlements are possible though by no
means inevitable consequences of the prior elirnination of serious social and econornic
sources of elite disunity.
A second issue concerns the extent to which the elite settlements described
actually fulfill the conditions required for the generation of consensual elites. 1 shall
argue that they do noto First of all, they are not comprehensive, for the obvious
reason that those elites ruling at the time of the settlement were excluded. Second, no
attempt is made to demonstrate that the settlement included all other elites. The initial
definition advanced specifically refers to a sudden and deliberate reorganization of
relations between previously warring elite factions. A true elite settlement, therefore,
should presumably be struck between currently warring factions, in and out of
power, not between factions previously hostile and currently out of power who
combine to regain it. Again, Burton and Higley specifically note that these
settlements were not comprehensive, pointing to the need to "distinguish between the
initial, basic settlement and its subsequent consolidation" (ibid.: 299).
Burton and Higley here acknowledge empirically that the ousted rulers and other
groups were initially excluded, but faíl to admit to the necessary consequences for
their theory. The first is that these are as much "two-step" transformations as any
others. This in turn requires detailed attention to the "second step" that completes the
settlement. No such detail is given, and if it were, that step would be revealed to
consist, as often as not, of confirmation of exclusion, rather than incorporation. The
second is that if these settlements were not comprehensive, their unique character as
sudden and deliberate negotiation of hitherto divisive differences incorporating all
elites and thus ensuring political stability dissolves, and they become difficult to
distinguish from myriads of other successful broad alliances against unsatisfactory
ruling regimes through history. This weakness is compounded by the fact that no
attempt is made to establish that all other elites were involved; on the contrary,
considerable emphasis is given to the point that those engaged in negotiation were
primarily leading politicians from previous regimes. On the authors' own account,
only political elítes were involved in England, Sweden, and Colombia, and only
polítical and business leaders in Venezuela. It seems, then, unless further evidence
can be provided, that these "elite settlements" were neither comprehensive nor
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suddenly concluded. It is clear that significant and fairly unusual acts of sudden and
deliberate compromise between some previously contending elite factions took place,
but not that consensually unified elites as defined elsewhere were created by these
acts. On the crucial issues of acceptance of procedural norms, restrained
partisanship, and effective access, only the scantiest details are given, necessarily as
regards effective access, as no evidence is offered as to the substantive interests of the
elites involved.
A third issue, which is not addressed at all, concerns the mechanisms by which
elite settlements once achieved might be projected into the future. Even if historical
episodes could be found that satisfied the criteria for elite transformation to full
consensual unity, one might reasonably ask for some such explanation, as it is clearly
crucial to the argument regarding the link between consensual unity and poli tic al
stability.3 Otherwise we are in a nebulous terrain akin to that of postrevolutionary
socialist society, where the previous conflicts over politics have miraculously given
way to the humdrum "administration of things." It is ironic that a paradigm put
forward as a competitor to Marxism should reproduce so entirely one of its admitted
weaknesses. In fact the failure to provide any account of such mechanisms is more
than a reparable omission. It is the consequence of a gross contradiction, which
becomes apparent when the static and dynamic treatments of elite consensus are
compared. Consensual unity is said to be characterized by tacit consensus on the
roles of the game, and effective access. Yet over time the roles of the game cease to
command general support, and are often changed, sometimes in an atmosphere of
considerable conflict and dissent.4 Equally, the constituent elements of the
subscribing elites change, as a result not only of the admission of new sectors, but
also of the downgrading or elimination of old ones. If the roles of the game can cease
to command a consensus, and change, and if effective access can be lost, then there is
no once-and-for-all settlement at all, but a continual process of negotiation among
changing elite groups, jointIy commanding more or less comprehensive support,
some rising and some falling through history, and sharing a greater or les ser degree
of consensus over time. The authors of the new paradigm cannot address this issue,
for if they did the logic of their argument would collapse.5
A brief examination of the recent description of "two-step" transformation to
consensual elite unity confirms the arbitrary use of the basic definitions discussed
above, and reveals an even more arbitrary approach to the question of identification of
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the achievement of elite consensus. The most striking feature of the discussion of the
two-step transformation is that it entirely reverses the analytical procedure followed
previously and reflected in the discussion of elite settlements. Elsewhere the
argument has rested in the final analysis upon the identification of moments of elite
transformation, to the extent, as we have seen, that in the absence of such a
transformation we are advised to as sume that apparent stability is still precarious.
Here, though, the authors simply take political stability as given, then set themselves
the task of finding evidence of elite movement to consensual unity. They open their
paper with the statement that "few students of comparative politics would dispute the
assertion that France, Italy, Japan and West Germany are today stable democracies"
(Field et al. 1988b: 1). They then trace two-step transformations in their chosen
countries. In this account, strikes, protest actions and the emergence of neo-fascism
are seen as evidence of elite disunity in Italy in the 1950s (ibid.: p. 10), although we
have already seen that strikes and protest actions are not taken as evidence of loss of
elite unity in countries that have achieved it, and although the emergence of dissident
intellectual movements and left-wing terrorism in the late 1970s is held to have
prompted rather than disconfirmed elite transformation to consensual unity in the
same country. Communist support for antiterrorist legislation prompts the comment
that "this overt defence of existing institutions by the core component of the formerly
disaffected elite camp should be viewed as the second of the two steps by which the
Italian national elite was transformed from disunity to consensual unity" (ibid.: 15).
The use of evidence here suggests that whenever proof of unity or disunity, or
stability or instability is required, it will always be found. Furthermore, the approach
here confirms that consensual unity does not require the assent of all elites, and it
inaugurates a new flexibility with regard to empirical evidence of achieved elite
consensus.
Taking the four cases together, the first step to consensual unity is found in center
and right-wing cooperation under De Gaulle in France between 1958 and 1962; the
formation of the Moro-led Christian Democrat-Socialist coalition in Ita1y in 1963; the
outcome of the war, or perhaps Adenauer's coalition-building between 1949 and
1953, in West Germany; and perhaps the 1955 formation of the LDP in Japan, but
more likely the emergence of centrist factions between 1960 and 1964, and the shift
of the LPD to the center. The second step, which completes consensual unity, is
identified as the electoral triumph of the Socialists in France in 1981; the elite front
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against terrorism in Italy in 1979; perhaps the period between the 1959 Bad
Godesberg program and the 1961 elections in West Germany, but more suitably the
1966 Grand Coalition; and perhaps by the evolution by the mid-1980s in Japan of the
JSP to a position where it was no longer an antisystem party. The mere recital of the
varied phenomena is evidence enough that the qualifications for the certification of
unified elites are now so varied, and so permissive, that the attempt to apply any
rigorous test has be en abandoned, and few countries would fail to offer some
qualifying evidence. By the structure of the argument, which now infers consensual
unity from scholarly consensus on stability, then describes a gradual and multifaceted
move toward a significant degree of consensus, then seeks to select two turning
points to serve as the two steps that will justify the model, the authors are admitting in
practice that the achievement of elite consensus is a gradual and incomplete process,
and a matter of degree rather than abrupt transformation. They are also coming very
close to arguing that it is political stability that can be unerringly identified, and that
what preceded it must therefore have been the achievement of consensual elite unity.
Thus, the method through which elite settlements were explored is reversed. In the
first case, elite settlements are initially identified, and it is then argued that what
followed was political stability; in the second case, political stability is identified first,
and it is then argued that what preceded it were transformations (in two stages in this
case) to elite unity.
The problems arising from the inconsistency of treatment of elite settlements and
two-step transformations, respectively, are compounded by the discriminatory
treatment accorded to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The first two are cited as
cases of two-step transformations, with Denmark's occurring between 1901 and
1935, and Norway's between 1884 and 1935. Sweden, on the other hand, having
experienced an "elite settlement" in the early nineteenth century, is deemed to have
been stable thenceforward, and presumably not to have required further settlements or
elite transformations. Yet, events in Sweden in the 1930s appear to have followed a
pattern rather similar to those in Denmark and Norway. In 1932 a period of intense
partisan rivalry ended with an electoral alliance in the "cow trade" between the
Agrarian Party and the Social Democrats. This was followed, in 1938, by the
Saltjobaden agreement, in which labor, business, farmers, and government
negotiated a comprehensive pact that set the course of Swedish social democracy for
over a generation.
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As Gourevitch comments, the 1932 electoral arrangement preceded similar
developments in Denmarkand Norway. He further provides, in his brief but
analytically acute account of the period, good reason to doubt the adequacy of the
general approach adopted by the new elite theorists. First, he underlines the
significance of the national and international economic context, asserting that
internationally oriented firms only accepted the fundamental compromise after 1936,
helped by the beginnings of recovery, and that likewise farrners could accept the
policy comprornises of the period for the longer term in view of their own improved
conditions from the same periodo Second, he sketches out a quite different dynamic
from that proposed in the two-step transformation: in this case, the final push to
comprehensive settlement was given by the failure of the Agrarian Party to form a
government alone, and its coming to terms with the fact that the Social Democrats
could not be excluded. Here, then, conditions of crisis after 1930 were met with a
conditional alliance between conservatives and moderating radical s, with the latter
able to establish a majority and win over conservative reca1citrants in conditions of
economic recovery that made the basic compromise sketched out in the depression
years acceptable as a fundamental policy orientation.6 The Swedish case in the 1930s
therefore casts doubt on the validity of the distinction between these three
Scandinavian cases, or at least upon the alleged efficacy of Sweden's first elite
settlement. It also strongly suggests that the prescribed dynamic of the two-step
transformation may be too reductionist, in its elimination in practice of substantive
social and economic issues from consideration, and too determinist in its imposition
of a rigid path to the completion of the two-step process. To summarize, the
development of the two-step transformation reverses the earlier logic of the paradigm,
and reinforces the doubts raised by its definitional structure, and the treatment of elite
settlements.
New Elitism Versus Old Marxism
One of the most insistent claims made by the proponents of the new elite paradigm is
that it stands ready to fill the vacuum created by the weakened hold of pluralist and
Marxist alternatives. This is linked to an equally consistent emphasis upon the causal
priority attached to elite transformations to consensual unity in the achievement of
political stability. Thus, Hurton and Higley seek to shift attention "from the
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establishment of democratic institutions to the empirically distinct, causally prior,
circumstances and actions of elites" (Burton and Higley 1987b: 296), and to
"postulate a causal relationship between elites and regimes, in which elite structure is
viewed as logically and factually prior to regime stability" (Higley and Burton 1988:
9). Where such formulations are advanced in the context of a stated preference for
political over "social structural" types of explanation, it allows the impression to
emerge that a distinctively political analysis is being advanced. In this section, I shall
argue that despite occasional appearances, and apparent claims, to the contrary, the
break made with "social structural" explanations is only partial. What is more, an
examination of the partial character of the break will reveal a heavy reliance upon
class-based explanation, and suggest that as it stand s at present, the new elitist
paradigm is distinguished from Marxism only by its arbitrary refusal to inquire at all
into the areas where the competing approaches rnight be evaluated.
Although the new elite theorists argue that elite transformations to consensual
unity are essentially political acts, and are causally prior to both poli tic al stability and
to possible eventual transitions to democracy, they do not in fact deny that elite
transformations themselves may have social structural antecedents. Instead, they
declare themselves agnostic as to their possible causality (above, p. 13). The
consequences of this stance are seen most clearly in Burton and Higley's account of
the elite settlement of 1688-89 in England. They refer to Moore's argument that the
civil war gave rise to government by a "committee of landlords," and Skocpol's
contention that it "established the dominance of the landed upper class over the
monarchy," they then state that "from our perspective, Moore and Skocpol are
certainly right that the events of the seventeenth century secured upper-c1ass
dominance of the English political regime. But unlike them we think the crucial
development in this process was the settlement fashioned by previously disunified,
mainly upper-class elite factions in 1688-89." Thus, more than anything else, "the
unification of predominantIy upper-c1ass elite factions via a sud den and deliberate
settlement secured upper-class control of the regime . . ." (B urton and Higley 1987b:
302).
There are several features worthy of comment here. First, the authors do not
reject a class analysis. On the contrary, whatever the full array of elite sectors they
might identify elsewhere, they are willing to reduce them to class force s here.
Second, they locate elite settlement within a broader process, asserting only that the
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settlement itself was the crucial step. Third, the assertion that settlement was the
crucial step is affirmed, but not defended. Fourth, it comes at the end of the process,
rather than originating it. Fifth, beyond the acceptance of the view that upper-class
dominance was achieved through the civil war, no attempt is made to ascertain the
substantive interests of the groups involved in elite settlement, or the extent to which
those elites and their interests may have been reshaped during and after the years of
civil war, and prior to the eventual settlement. It seems doubtful, therefore, that elite
settlement has been shown to be causally prior to the achievement of political stability
in any sense that validates a political over a social structural analysis; at most it
suggests that there is a political dimension to be taken into account. What is more,
there is neither any challenge, nor any addition, to fairly crude class analysis. The
authors do claim at one point that they "find few indications that in arranging
settlements elites were mainly reflecting broader social or economic or cultural
forces." But this claim is entirely innocuous. It is not inconsistent with the view that
they were setting up a system that would allow them to advance and protect their own
interests in the future; indeed, this is the very alternative immediately proposed:
"Rather, the settlements apparently grew out of deliberate, relatively autonomous elite
choice s among an array of possible strategies for protecting their diverse factional
interests" (ibid.). Once again, then, the argument faithfully reflects the refusal to
inquire into the nature of elite interests, and the possible bases for their conciliation.
In any case, a political settlement could eventually ensue some considerable time after
intraelite social and economic conflicts had been resolved, and that may well be the
case here. In fact, no defense is mounted at all against an explanation that seems
entirely consistent with the facts as presented: that elite settlement, though by no
means inevitable, was only possible because of the reordering of class force s that
carne about during and after the civil war. The process of unification may have
culminated in the settlement to which so much importance is attached, but it did not
consist solely of that settlement. On the contrary, it was a protracted, multifaceted
one in which the resolution of fundamental social and economic sources of conflict
arguably merits explanatory priority. Perhaps it does not, but as Burton and Higley
do not enter into the argument, which must be a crucial one if we are to discriminate
between their paradigm and possible "social structural" rivals, we cannot accept that
they have done more than state, and restate, their own faith in this regard.
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Further doubt is cast upon the extent to which a robust altemative to a class-based
paradigm is being offered by the fact that the only substantive explanation offered for
the impetus to elite transformation to consensual unity is itself class-based. Beyond
pointing to a sequence of protracted and inconclusive conflict followed by a major
political crisis, Burton and Higley argue, as we have seen, that acts of elite settlement
were preceded and in part prompted by "the unleashing of leveling social
revolutionary tendencies" in civil wars in England and Colombia, and "indications of
the potential for leveling tendencies to take control" in Sweden and Venezuela (ibid.:
298). It seems, therefore, that they are receptive to the suggestion that all confirmed
cases of elite settlement can be explained as the negotiation of dominant class unity in
response to a threat from below. Here, again, we are handicapped in our evaluation
of the underlying argument by the fact that the presentation of the cases of elite
settlement depends upon a "borrowed" class analysis for the English case, while no
other is examined in detail. We may only say, therefore, that as it stands, the
paradigm offers at best a supplement to class analysis, rather than an altemative to it.
If we look elsewhere, though, we find much stronger evidence of the superiority
of a clearly Marxist paradigm, largely provided by Burton and Higley themselves.
We have already noted that while the treatment of elite settlements gives some
consideration to the inevitability and variability of elites, it has yet to specify the
significance of elite-nonelite interdependence. The discussion of this third topic
elsewhere throws considerable light on the relation of the new elitist paradigm to a
Marxist alternative, and inadvertently confirms the force of the criticisms offered here
with regard to the failure to inquire into the substantive basis, or lack of it, for elite
unification. In their extended discussion of elite-nonelite interdependence, Burton
and Higley suggest that Pareto's musings on the subject should be modified by
bringing his own recognition of the importance of material interests more to the fore,
and modifying the latter "so as to incorporate the generally Marxian idea that an
individual's politically relevant interests and inclinations are rooted in his or her
location in the social division of labour" (Burton and Higley 1987a: 234). This leads
them to reaffirm a three-way characterization of nonelites laid out earlier (Field and
Higley 1980: 21-35), and to argue, as noted above, that the balance between different
nonelite types that results constrains elite options by setting broad limits to the kinds
of support to which they can appeal. In what follows, they venture further to
suggest that "in any relatively bureaucratized society, the social division of labor is
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great enough to ensure that nonelite interests and inclinations are themselves
conflicting, usually, but not always, along the lines of the class-based conflicts that
Mandan theory depicts" (ibid.: 235).
This approach to the understanding of nonelites is interesting enough in itself. It
is most significant, however, for what is not said, in that the same criterion is not
applied to the analysis of elites. If nonelites are to be approached through their
locations in the social division of labor, and if the conflicts between them are to be
assumed to be usually class-based, what justification is there for declining to analyze
elites in the same way? The treatment given to nonelites here (significantly,
improving on the original elitist analysis by introducing thoroughly Marxist concepts,
rather than showing that a Marxist analysis can be bettered by introducing concepts
from elitism) strongly reinforces the argument that the failure to inquire at all
elsewhere into the substantive interests of elites reflects the lack, in the elitist
paradigm, of any alternative approach to the identification of those substantive
interests.
The approach adopted is saved from transmutation into a fully fledged Marxist
analysis only by treating elites, unlike nonelites, as lacking substantive interests, and
by calling an arbitrary halt to the analysis of key historical episodes at the moment of
political unification, by declining to inquire too closely into what has gone before.
This brings us directly to the secret at the heart of the new elite paradigm. It achieves
its balancing of political and social structural factors in the explanation of political
change by arbitrarily treating the attitudes and orientations of nonelites as entirely
determined by their location in the social division of labor, and those of elites as
entirely unconstrained by any such factors. Nonelites are autonoma, driven by an
iron structural determinism, and providing arenas for elite choice not by exercise of
their own free will, but as passive vessels of predetermined orientations. Elites enter
the politica! arena free of any given interests or social and economic ties, and have the
ability, if they will, to maintain a degree of consensus among themselves sufficient to
perpetuate their elite status and privileges. Thus, "the paradigm holds that the
essential choice s of politics are elite choices because non-elite orientations are fairly
firmly fixed by the basic circumstances of different kinds of work in the four levels of
development" (Field and Higley 1980: 47). Recent developments of explanatory
theory out of the paradigm have faithfully reflected this arbitrary polarization of
choice and determinism, and should be seen as embodying a set of ideologically
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charged assumptions, rather than exploring the complexities of processes of poli tic al
change in the real world.
Conclusion
The new elite theorists argue that political stability can only be secured through elite
transformation to consensual unity, characterized by agreement on procedural roles,
and by effective access. They identify and describe in detail elite settlements and two-
step transformations as two of the three historical forms such elite transformations
have taken, special coloniallegacies being the third. They further contend that once
such transformations have taken place, poli tic al stability is secured, and transitions to
enduring democracy become possible. And they present these arguments as being
explanatory theories of the kind that are essential if their new elitist paradigm is to win
general acceptance. 1 have argued, in response, that (1) they do not provide a c1ear
distinction between political stability and instability, independently of their
identification of elite states; (2) they improperly seek to allocate historically existing
elites to polar opposite ideal types, as "unified" or "disunified," ignoring possible
intermediate categories or the case for a continuum along the dimension of unity; (3)
they consequently generate significant disproportionality between the concepts of
consensual elite unity and political stability; (4) they do not inquire sufficiently into
the character of different elite sectors, and the relations between them; (5) they do not
examine at all the substantive interests of elite sectors, and the changes in them that
might precede the achievement of consensual unity or help to explain its absence; (6)
they are therefore unable to explain the success, as opposed to the motivation, of
elites seeking consensual unity; (7) they provide no basis for their claim that once
achieved, procedural consensus and effective access will be maintained indefinitely,
and in particular (8) they are unable to account for changes in procedural rules and
elite structure after transformations to consensual unity; (9) their accounts of elite
settlements do not conform to the definitions of such transformations, as they are
neither comprehensive, nor suddenly achieved; (10) the logic of explanation
employed with regard to elite settlements is unceremoniously reversed in the treatment
of two-step transformations, and (11) in those two-step transformations the
identification of the successive steps is essentially arbitrary; (12) the completion of
two-step transformations is claimed for Oenmark and Norway in the 1930s, in which
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case Sweden also clearly qualifies, and the case for the finality of the original elite
settlement falls; (13) where specific explanations are advanced they are generally
class-based and in some cases taken directly from Marxism; and (14) where class-
based or social structural explanations are rejected, it is on the basis of a prior refusal
to enter into the necessary debate on points of substance, rather than on the basis of
the advancing of superior explanations consistent with the new paradigm advanced.
Finally, (15) the paradigm relies ultimately upon a parceling out of structural
determinism and voluntarism that allows elite s to make entirely unconstrained political
choice s, while ascribing to the situations of nonelites a degree of determinism that
would put the most vulgar of Marxists to shame. For all these reasons, 1 question the
larger claims made with regard to the rehabilitation of elite theory, and its superior
claims over rival approaches.
NOTES
lSee Field and Higley, 1980, 1985; Bueton and Higley, 1987a, 1987b; Higley and Bueton, 1988; and
Field et al. 1988a, 1988b.
2In fact, Field and Higley (1980, p. 41) leave open the question of whether consensually unified elites
will succeed in managing the conflicts arising out of postindustrialism ("Level 4 society"). But the
distinction between levels of development is not incorporated into later statements of the theory, and if
the qualification is maintained it follows, first, that some explanation is required for the ability of elite
consensus to handle some nonelite configurations but not others, as elite consensus elsewhere appears
sufficient in itself; and, second, that most Westem democracies can no longer be considered politically
stable as a consequence of elite consensus: the recent cases of two-step transformation would have to
be deemed to have passed into political stability and immediately out of it again. At the very least,
the qualification would require that the scope of the theory be restricted to bureaucratically organized
societies until they pass into postindustrialism. 1 am assuming, therefore, that the relationship
between elite consensus and political stability is seen as holding at Level 4.
3For a relevant discussion, and some pointers as to the form such an analysis might take, see the
section on "institutional persistence" in Krasner (1988). Krasner draws upon Stinchcombe (1968) to
emphasize the need for an explanation of "how institutions persist over time, even though their
environments may change" (ibid., p. 81). His insistence that accounts of originating events also
require "an examination of how preexisting structures delimit the range of possible options" is equally
relevant, and equally reveals the paucity of the "explanatory" focus adopted here.
4Thus, the successive extensions of the franchise in England/Great Britain and Sweden would appear
to require individual detailed examination. It is relevant also to note that in December 1988 an elite
movement entitled "Charter 88" was launched in Britain, protesting the increasingly authoritarian
character of the government, and calling, among other things, for a bill of rights, proportional
representation, the replacement of the House of Lords with a democratic, nonhereditary second
chamber, and the placing of "all agencies of the state under the rule of law." Its founding charter
argues that "the events of 1688 only shifted the absolute power of the monarch into the hands of the
parliamentary oligarchy," and reflects considerable dissent in Britain with the "rules of the game" as
they stand at presento For details, see New Statesman and Society, 2 December 1988, pp. 10-11.
5Elsewhere, and in a different context, the need for poli tic al settlements between and within nations to
be "negotiated over and over again" is strongly emphasized (Field and Higley 1980: 95). It is not clear
why the considerations advanced there are judged irrelevant to the broader issue here.
6See P. Gourevitch (1986), pp. 131-134. Gourevitch comments that of all his case studies (of
responses to economic crisis in Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States after 1873,
after 1929, and in the 1980s), "the accommodation in Sweden was the most explicit piece of social
bargaining among social forces in any of our five countries for any of oue three periods" (ibid., p.
134).
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